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1. Lawrence Livermore representative Roger Miller and Department of Energy representative Richard Nephew briefed the MFA's Assistant Minister for American Affairs Ali al Hefny and MFA disarmament specialists on Iran's Gas Centrifuge Program on January 29. Al Hefny said Egypt appreciated the opportunity to continue engaging with the U.S. on the Iran issue and noted that Egypt shared the USG's concerns. He also flagged Egypt's concern about Israel and said the GOE's goal is to create a zone in the Middle East free of WMD. Al Hefny urged the U.S. to consider regional perspectives on the WMD threat and to take an "even-handed" approach.

2. MFA's disarmament experts asked the DOE team:

- if the U.S. knows exactly what Iran has achieved.
- if the U.S. knows how long it would take for Iran to complete its pilot program.
- if the U.S. knows of any clandestine facilities in Iran



where enrichment technology is being developed.

-- if the U.S. endorses the Russian proposal

-- if the U.S. is worried that Iran will make good on its threats to end diplomacy (and possibly pull out of the NPT) if the IAEA refers it to the UNSC.

3. Miller replied that we don't know exactly what Iran has achieved, but it may not need a significant amount of time to complete the pilot program. Miller also noted that it is easier for Iran to conceal a clandestine facility behind a declared facility. On the Russian proposal, Miller said U.S. support depends on the ability to ensure that Iran does not have access to enrichment technology. On the risk of referral, Miller acknowledged Iran's threats, but cited Iran's interest in remaining within the NPT regime. Iran's threats are not, he noted, a reason to ignore the requirements of the NPT regime. Nephew added that unlike the case of North Korea before it withdrew from the NPT, Iran has more political and economic interests to remain in the regime.

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